BEHIND MALI’S CONFLICT – MYTHS, REALITIES & UNKNOWNS

This article presents selected issues about a military operation in Mali. On 11th January
2013, France launched Operation Serval, a military offensive in Mali. The operation is
code-named after the Serval, a medium sized African wild-cat. Since the beginning of operation,
French president Francois Hollande has maintained that his country’s military intervention
has no other goal “than the fight against terrorism”2.
Although the response to the crisis in Mali has revealed the shortcomings of the multilateral
security architecture in the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas),
the African Union (AU) and the UN, the first phase of Opération Serval in Mali is assessed
as having achieved its aims in the first ten days of deployment.
It succeeded in securing Bamako, stopping the terrorist advance, striking terrorist rear
bases, and setting the conditions for the arrival of African troops. They have retaken terrorist-
held urban areas and pushed deep into the rural strongholds. Unsurprisingly, given the
training, equipment and capabilities of the French forces, they did so rapidly and efficiently.
It’s too soon to declare Operation Serval a success, and there are already concerns about
its eventual end, but the French-led military intervention in Mali has at least brought the
country back from the brink of disaster, and opened up a space in which Malians can finally
begin to chart a way forward for their nation.

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