MODERNISATION OF THE ARMOURED COMPONENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S GROUND FORCES IN THE YEARS 2015–2018. AN OUTLINE OF THE SUBJECT

In the world that began to be shaped almost ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, after a relatively short period of almost total hegemony of the United States, the direction of change led to a clear formation of a new polycentric geopolitical order. The theses about the "end of history" presented by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 did not come true, although they confirmed the final closure of the Cold War era. In the first years of the 21st century, especially after the experiences of the economic crises (2008), the policies of the major states on the international scene aimed at increasing assertiveness in external relations. This was particularly true of Russia, which - since Vladimir Putin took power on December 31, 1999 - it focused on the rebuilding of the empire, and its final shape was to mark the boundaries of the failed superpower. The Kremlin's actions resulted in the war with Georgia in 2008, the seizure of the Crimea in 2014 and the intervention in Syria in 2015. At the same time, in spite of demographic problems, the expansion of Western economic sanctions and relatively low oil and gas prices (which are the main source of income for the country), the modernisation of the Russian armed forces, which began on a large scale in 2008, was continued. The aim of the paper is to report the latest trends in the scale and scope of modernization of the armoured component of Russian Ground Forces in the years 2015-2018 and the factors that had a direct impact on the described process in the current conditions resulting from the emergence of the "new Cold War" in Russia's relations with the West after 2014.

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