MODERN MANAGEMENT REVIEW **2019**
MMR, vol. XXIV, 26 (1/2019), p. 17-26 **January-March**

Łukasz JUREŃCZYK[1]

INVESTMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE AFGHAN MINING SECTOR

The purpose of the article is to present and evaluate the investment management of enterprises from the People's Republic of China in the Afghan mining sector in the broader economic and strategic context. It presents the causes, circumstances, barriers and prospects for the implementation of investments in the extraction of Afghan copper, energy raw materials and other minerals. So far, the largest investments in Afghanistan have been made by large state-owned enterprises, including Metallurgical Corporation of China and China National Petroleum Corporation. The success of their investments is currently a big question mark, and the involvement of other Chinese enterprises in the Afghan mining sector and other segments of the economy depends on this. The research problem is included in the question of the role of Chinese investments in the Afghan mining industry in Beijing's policy towards that country and neighboring regions of Asia.

Keywords: Afghanistan, People's Republic of China, mining industry, investment management, copper, energy resources.

1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

In Afghanistan a significant amount of natural resources is located, the approximate level of which is currently being determined. International geology experts most often estimate the value of Afghan mineral deposits in the range between one and three trillion USD (International Business Publications, 2012). They include metal deposits, with significant lodes of copper, iron and lithium, construction and chemical raw materials, gemstones as well as significant reserves of energy resources, including crude oil, natural gas and coal. Due to the turbulent history of Afghanistan, these raw materials are almost intact. The increasing global competition of the states for exhausting natural resources caused that Afghanistan has become a place of interest for investors from various parts of the world, including the People's Republic of China (PRC).

China's investment in the mining sector in Afghanistan is a consequence of Beijing's two strategic goals in Central Asia. First of all, it is to provide its dynamically developing economy with a diversified and constant supply of natural resources. Secondly, it is the stabilization of neighboring countries through economic cooperation. Investments in the extraction of natural resources and intensification of trade are intended to give benefits to all parties of the cooperation. Maintaining the two main values in the PRC policy in the 21st

[1] Łukasz Jureńczyk, DSc, PhD, university professor, Institute of Political Science, Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, J. Poniatowskiego 12 St., 85-001 Bydgoszcz; e-mail: lukasz-jurenczyk@ukw.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0003-1149-925X.

century, i.e. security and development is to enable China to continue its economic expansion in Asia and other parts of the world.

Sustaining development and tightening of economic relations limit the risk of appearance of serious internal and external instability and the outbreak of armed conflicts. China, which needs natural resources, makes significant capital investments in the mining sector of Afghanistan. Thanks to this, it provides itself with a new source of raw materials, located in the close vicinity. The import of minerals is offset by the export of industrial goods, which increases the demand for Chinese products. This cooperation also brings tangible benefits to Afghanistan. First and foremost, it derives income from the sale of raw materials and tax revenues. In addition, new jobs are created in Afghanistan in the mining sector and related industries. An additional incentive for Afghanistan is the involvement of Chinese enterprises in the development of the country's infrastructure, mainly in the field of transportation. The Chinese authorities also provide limited assistance to the government of Afghanistan. Common goals, i.e. security and development, and mutual benefits motivate partners to cooperate. Economic activities are supported by diplomatic efforts, and all this should lead to speed up the process of stabilization of Afghanistan and to strengthen the bilateral relations. Looking broader, this cooperation is also intended to strengthen security throughout entire region. An important aspect that facilitates the Sino-Afghan relationship is non-interference in the internal affairs and full respect of the adopted systemic solutions.

The purpose of the article is to present and evaluate the investment management of companies from the People's Republic of China in the Afghan mining sector. The research problem concerns the role of Chinese investments in the Afghan mining sector in Beijing's policy towards Afghanistan and Central Asia as a whole. The article outlines three main theses. First of all, investments in the Afghan mining industry are the main measure used by Beijing to stabilize the country. By these investments, however, China especially wants to increase its influence in the country and in the Central Asia where it competes with Russia, United States, India and regional powers. Secondly, these investments are very risky, mainly due to the unstable security situation in Afghanistan. Thirdly, despite the potentially large economic and political benefits, Chinese investments in Afghanistan are secondary to its investments in many other states of Central Asia. Afghanistan, however, is to play an important role in the development of China's economic cooperation with the countries of this part of Asia. The outlined research problem is a part of the broader problem of China's search for resources in developing countries. In that field particularly important is a book edited by Fengshi Wu and Hongzhou Zhang, *China's Global Quest for Resources: Energy, Food and Water.* The issue of Chinese investments in the Afghan mining sector is relatively new and research in this area should be carried out on an ongoing basis. The article uses the method of source analysis.

2. PRC INVESTMENTS IN THE EXTRACTION OF AFGHAN COPPER

In 2015, the global consumption of purified copper reached the level of 23 million tons. Its largest world consumer was China, using 11.3 million tons, which was almost half of the volume (International Copper Study Group, 2016). A similar situation on the copper consumption market has been maintained for several years. For this reason, China is interested in the extraction of huge deposits of Afghan copper. They are located in the copper basin of Afghanistan - Mes Aynak in the province of Logar in the south-eastern part of the country. Mes Aynak in translation from Pashto literally means "little source of copper".

This name, however, does not reflect reality, because in practice it may contain as much as 6 million tons of copper. According to estimates, the total value of copper and other resources located in Mes Aynak can reach up to 40 billion USD (Gartenstein-Ross, Trombly, Barr, 2014).

In 2007, the Kabul authorities accepted the offer of the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Company (JCC) for the expansion and exploitation of the Mes Aynak mine. MCC won the contract by outbidding the offer of mining corporations from eight countries, including enterprises with American, Russian, British and Canadian majority capital. Western observers reported that the tender was settled by a number of corruption activities by the MCC towards Afghan officials (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2014). Among others, the minister of mine affairs -Mohammad Ibrahim Adel was accused for accepting a bribe of 30 million USD (Zaborowski, 2012). Allegations of this kind may be legitimate because Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

When applying for a contract, the Chinese company promised to implement a number of accompanying investments, which competitors could not afford to propose. MCC made a promise to expand the infrastructure around the mine, including the construction of a coal mine and a 400MW coal power plant, the expansion of the railway network, the construction of schools, hospitals and even mosques (Ali, 2015). This commitment seemed credible because MCC is China's leading engineering and construction company, and investment in the mining industry is a part of its development and diversification (Downs, 2012). All of the funds invested in Afghanistan were to reach 10 billion USD. At the moment, the Chinese withdrew from the promise to expand the railway network and build coal mine and coal-fired power plant. It is a consequence of a number of problems that have appeared on the way to the implementation of the project (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2014).

According to the contract, MCC and JCC were to invest 4 billion USD in five years just in the copper mine Mes Aynak. Therefore, at that time it was to be the largest foreign investment in Afghanistan. As a result of the expansion, the mine Mes Aynak is to be the second largest copper mine in the world, after the Escondida mine in Chile (Tripathi, 2016). The Afghan government is to earn 808 million USD on this investment for granting rights to extract copper and about 60 million USD annually for 30 years from taxes (Hausheng, 2012). The profit for MCC is expected to reach from several to several dozen billion USD, depending on the price of copper in the global market. JCC operating in the steel industry and having 25 percent shares in Mes Aynak will have guaranteed supplies of copper. This will allow it to become independent from the purchase copper from foreign producers and thus reduce the impact of fluctuations of its prices on the functioning of the enterprise. In addition, thanks to the planned annual supply of copper from Mes Aynak at the level of 200,000 tons JCC is to increase production by 50 percent. According to the agreement between MCC and JCC, the second of these entities has the pre-emption right of at least 50 percent of the copper mined in Mes Aynak (Downs, 2012).

The additional benefits for China and Afghanistan are new workplaces. The scale of using the local workforce is, however, debatable. Investments of Chinese enterprises in Africa show that they prefer to employ their own, better qualified and more disciplined employees (Gajda 2015). Nevertheless, at various stages of the investment implementation, there will be job for 3-10 thousand of people from both countries. Moreover, thanks to the development of related industrial sectors, potentially new jobs can be created for even tens of thousands of Afghans (Hynek, Eichler, 2012; Downs, 2012).

The enterprise in Mes Aynak can bring huge profits to investors, but it is burdened with a very high degree of risk. At best, the investment was supposed to start generating income after 7-10 years. This optimistic scenario turned out to be unreal, inter alia due to the location of the archaeological site in the mine area with Buddhist chapels, monasteries, statues and frescoes dated to the 5th and 6th centuries and signs of much older settlements dating back to the Bronze Age. The Chinese had to allocate 2 million USD to secure the artifacts there by the French Archaeological Mission in Afghanistan, to avoid further significant delay in the investment (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2014). The launching of the mining also shifted over time due to a number of disputes and discussions between the MCC and the Afghan government. These included, among others, construction permits, compensation for local villages, ecological requirements for mine heaps, work permits for Chinese workers, the level of duties for Chinese goods used in the implementation of investments, etc. (Crane, Greenfield, 2014). Such large investment will have a negative impact on the environment. First of all, it requires a huge amount of water, which is a scarce resource in Afghanistan. In addition, water and air quality will worsen, but this does not seem to be a significant drawback for Afghan central and regional authorities. A more serious problem is the need to acquire significant land for implementation of investment, which leads to objections of local communities. The workplaces offered to the inhabitants of nearby villages and towns are not always sufficient compensation for limiting access to land, water, wood and other goods. An additional barrier is infrastructure deficiencies that need to be completed so that the mine can function. It requires, inter alia, a stable source of electricity, a developed transport network, including roads and a railway line, as well as maintenance facilities.

The most serious problem, however, is the uncertain security situation. Logar Province is one of the most unstable in the country. Major rebel attacks in the vicinity of Mes Aynak occurred in August and September 2012. In August 2014, the offensive in the province of Logar against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was conducted by about 700 rebels. In addition, the Taliban have repeatedly launched rocket attacks on the mine itself to prevent the implementation of this flagship investment for the Afghan government. Next to the Taliban, military actions in the province of Logar are also carried out by militants of other rebel and terrorist groups. For these reasons, the work at Mes Aynak was stopped several times, and the staff was temporarily evacuated to China (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2014). To meet the expectations of the Chinese side, the Afghan government committed 2,000 soldiers and police officers to the protection of Mes Aynak. Unfortunately, security issues, corruption problems, legal controversies and archaeological barriers cause that so far the MCC can't extract Afghan copper.

Despite the problems with Mes Aynak, companies from China are also interested in the exploitation of Afghan iron ore fields. They took part in a tender to obtain the right to extract this raw material in Hajigak in the Bamyan province (Cordesman, Hess, 2014). The stake was high, because these deposits are not only the biggest in Afghanistan, but also constitute the largest un-exploited iron deposits in all of Asia. They cover approximately 2 billion tones iron ore with an average purity of approx. 62 percent. In this case, however, China lost the competition with foreign competition. In November 2011, the Afghan government handed over four of the five Hajigak blocks to a consortium from India, embracing seven companies operating under the leadership of the state enterprise - Steel Authority of India. This contract can be worth up to 10 billion USD in total. The last of the five blocks was put into operation by a Canadian company - Kilo Goldmines. In May 2016, Afghanistan, India and Iran signed an agreement to build a 900 kilometer railway line to connect the Hajigak mine with the Iranian railway network. This will allow access to the Iranian sea port in Chabahar, which will enable further transport of iron and other resources by sea. These contracts excluded Chinese companies from competing for biggest Afghan iron ore deposits.

3. PRC INVESTMENTS IN THE EXTRACTION OF AFGHAN ENERGY RESOURCES

In the case of deposits of Afghan energy resources, we can observe a differentiated approach to determining their estimated value. Some experts tend to exaggerate its potential level, without supporting provided data with reliable research. Others present value incomparably lower, based only on expertise carried out decades ago with usage of less advanced research tools than these currently available. Therefore, there is no certainty about the actual occurrence of energy raw materials at the suggested levels (Cordesman, Hess, 2014).

According to the preliminary calculations published in the “U.S. Geological Survey” Afghanistan can contain up to 1.6 billion barrels of crude oil, 16 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and 500 million barrels of liquid natural gas (Afghanistan Ministry of Mines). According to "glObserver" in Afghanistan there are confirmed, probable and possible natural gas deposits at the level of approx. 5 trillion cubic meters, located in the north of the country. It presents more modest data concerning the oil reserves, estimating its amount at the level of 100 million barrels located, among others, in Angot oil fields. The vast majority of hydrocarbon deposits are located in the north of the country, and in addition, small amounts of them have been identified in the east (*Afghanistan Energy Profile,* 2012). The “CIA World Factbook” contains information about confirmed reserves of natural gas at the level of 49.55 billion cubic meters (Central Intelligence Agency). In turn, “BP Statistical Review of Energy”, while discussing the world's oil deposits, did not provide any information about the confirmed resources of this raw material in Afghanistan (British Petroleum, 2012).

Data supported by more detailed geological surveys come mainly from the Soviets, who between 1960 and 1980 identified over 15 oil and gas fields in northern Afghanistan. Only 95 million barrels of oil - confirmed and probable deposits - were considered to be worth exploiting. So far, the symbolic volume of crude oil has been exploited in this region, the average volume of which was up to 500 barrels per day. It was mined mainly in Sar-e Pol province and near Sheberghan in Jowzjan province. To this day, a very small amount of oil is produced there, with usage of primitive retorts for its refining. In the area of Sheberghan there are also the main natural gas deposits, in Khowaja Gogerak, Djarquduk and Yatimtaq. In the mid-1970s, natural gas production in Afghanistan amounted to 275 million cubic meters per day, and when the Djarquduk deposits began to be exploited in 1978, it reached a peak of 385 million cubic meters per day. At present, in this region, small diameter pipelines supply gas to local consumers, and a larger pipe sends it to a 48 MW power plant located in the Mazar-i-Sharif area (*Afghanistan Energy Profile,* 2012).

Along with the dynamic economic development of the People's Republic of China, internal demand for fuels is increasing. China is the world's largest oil importer and also its import of natural gas is rapidly rising. Crude oil is purchased mainly from the Persian Gulf, while natural gas from Russia and Central Asia. The growing demand, however, means that China signs contracts for the extraction of energy resources also in other regions of the world, including Africa and South America. If it is possible to obtain these resources from

Afghanistan, geographic proximity certainly would be in favor. However, it should be noticed that even if the upper levels of Afghanistan's estimate deposits are correct, it may still take several decades to put in production capacity to the level which would guarantee net profits from the investments. This requires the implementation of significant infrastructure investments, and above all depends on the security conditions. Therefore, entering the Afghan market for the extraction of energy resources should be treated as a long-term investment with a high degree of risk.

In December 2011, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) together with a joint-venture partner, the Afghan company Watan Group, obtained a contract for the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the basin of Amu Darya, in the provinces of Sar-e Pol and Faryab in northern Afghanistan. It is to take place on three fields - Kashkari, Bazarkhami and Zamarudsay. In this way, the CNPC became the first foreign company which signed a contract to extract Afghan hydrocarbons (Pantucci, Petersen, 2012). CNPC has previously extracted oil and natural gas from the same geological structure in Turkmenistan. The investment in Afghanistan gives China the opportunity to increase the extraction of energy resources as well as to expand the transmission network in Central Asia. In June 2012, the CNPC signed a framework agreement with the government of Afghanistan to determine the viability of building a pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to China. This route could also be used to import gas from Iran, in which CNPC got a contract for the exploitation of part of the South Pars, the world's largest natural gas field (Downs, 2012).

The contract for the extraction of Afghan hydrocarbons has been signed for 25 years and is estimated to be worth 700 million USD. For Afghanistan, it is to give a profit of at least 7 billion USD in 25 years (Hausheng, 2012). This is due to the fact that the management of the CNPC agreed on very favorable conditions for the partner. It agreed, among other things, to give Afghanistan 70 percent of profits from the project, 15 percent royalty on oil production and to pay 20 percent corporate tax and additional taxes for the lease of land for investment (Cordesman, Hess, 2014). The CNPC also promised to build an oil refinery in Afghanistan. This means that if the project is implemented, Afghanistan will cease to be almost entirely dependent on the import of energy resources. It would be a significant relief to the Afghan budget, because as an example in 2012 Afghanistan paid about 3.5 billion USD for the import of oil from Russia, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.

Due to the uncertain size of the exploitable fields and the unstable security situation, the CNPC investment is of speculative nature. The Chinese side won the contract without any problems because most potential competitors, including American oil concerns, did not decide to take this risk. By entering the tender, the Chinese hoped that the investment would be successfully implemented because the north of the country seemed relatively calm. In recent years, however, there has been a significant deterioration of the security situation, including in the Faryab province, where extraction is to be carried out. The Taliban attacks increased when in 2012 most of the US special force and the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team withdrew from the province. Although most of the oil fields leased by the CNPC are located in the Sar-e Pol province, the direct proximity to the Faryab province carries a high risk of spreading instability. The Taliban and other rebel and terrorist groups are not the only paramilitary forces that disturb the workers implementing the project. It was also done by the troops of General Rashid Dostum, who tried to force the participation in investment profits. Eventually, an agreement was probably reached between the Chinese company and the Uzbek warlord (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2014). In October 2012, the mining process was officially inaugurated. CNPC announced then that from 2013 it would extract 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per year. According to the agreement, until the construction of the refinery in Afghanistan, the extracted oil goes to the refinery in Turkmenistan and is then sold to Afghans and foreign customers (Gacek, 2013).

In the context of acquiring energy resources in Afghanistan, it is worth paying attention to the relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, because these powers are globally competing for access to hydrocarbons. For the US, the diversification of oil supplies is as important as for China. American entrepreneurs and society are outraged that Chinese companies start investments in Afghanistan, benefiting from the huge US stabilization effort. In July 2012, information appeared that the American ExxonMobil concern is interested in hydrocarbon exploitation in northern Afghanistan. This was to counter criticism from the Republican Party congressmen for the passivity of the United States on the Afghan mining market (Gacek, 2013). So far, however, no concrete action from the American fuel sector giant has been seen. Oil concerns from the US also have plans to extract hydrocarbons in Central Asia states neighboring with Afghanistan. The authorities in Beijing are convinced that Washington wants to establish close economic relations with the countries of the region to limit the ability of China to operate in its immediate vicinity, mainly in the field of energy import (Qassem, 2009). Therefore, Beijing is trying to strengthen relations with the countries of the region in order to push out American energy interests from it. It is also very important for China to limit the influence of its major regional economic competitor – India, both in Afghanistan and, more broadly, in Central Asia. Chinese enterprises invest in local mining markets, as well as expand transmission and communication routes in Central Asia. An increasingly important element in this regional economic network is Afghanistan. The reason is its location, potential raw materials deposits, as well as instability, which, unchecked, may spread to the countries of Central Asia and the western provinces of China.

In Afghanistan there is also coal deposit estimated at 73 million tones. Its majority is located in the north of the country, between Herat and Badakhshan. At the beginning of the 1990s, nearly 100,000 tons of coal was produced in Afghanistan per year. In the following years, however, mining drastically decreased (*Afghanistan Energy Profile*, 2012). Initially, it was the result of a growing civil war between the mujahideen groups. In subsequent years, it resulted from the Taliban's lack of interest in the industrialization of the country. Coal mining in Afghanistan is important because neighboring China is the biggest coal importer in the world. China also has pledged to build a coal-fired power plant in Afghanistan (Tripathi, 2016). As previously mentioned, the investor has suspended plans for its construction. However, it is not out of the question that in favorable circumstances the project will be reactivated.

4. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Officially large investments in the Afghan mining industry are based on the decisions of the management boards of Chinese enterprises. The actual originator, however, is most probably the Chinese communist government. That assumption results from a few basic premises. First, the MCC and CNPC are centrally administered state-owned enterprises whose leadership is elected by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Secondly, for the Chinese authorities, copper and oil are of strategic importance in the context of stable economic development of the country. Thirdly, the location of Afghanistan causes that its stability is very important for the safety of Chinese trade routes for energy and mineral resources. Fourthly, China's significant economic presence in Afghanistan limits the growth of influence of the main competitor from the region – India, and global competitor – US (Downs, 2012). Fifthly, it is easier for Chinese enterprises to win large contracts in Afghanistan than for western companies. In contrast, they are not strictly dependent on shareholders, and therefore do not have to be focused on a certain profit. Because they are state-owned enterprises, they also have access to cheaper capital. In addition, they receive much more prominent diplomatic support of their own state authorities than foreign competitors (Downs, 2012).

China's involvement in supporting of the stability of Afghanistan is very limited. PRC is reluctant to engage militarily in Afghanistan. It also distances itself from the possibility of supporting stabilization efforts of NATO in this country (Dobbins, 2014). This raises accusations of the international community towards China that its significant investments in the mining sector are a kind of "stowaways". Negative attitude was not changed by the limited training for officers of Afghan security forces carried out for several years in Chinese universities. After the completion of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan China did not take bigger responsibility for the country's security. On the contrary, it forces the Afghan government to increase its efforts to protect Chinese investments. China wants to avoid dangerous situations, like the one which took place in June 2004, when eleven Chinese construction workers were killed in the Kunduz province in the north-east part of the country (Lanteigne, 2016). In 2012, the Afghan ministry of mining held in disposal 7,000 officers of the so-called mining police, which contributed to the protection of the mining sector only to a limited extent (Gacek, 2013). In this regard, the Afghan government promised to train specialized military personnel to protect foreign workers, mines and pipelines during the implementation of the investments. They protect investments made both by Chinese enterprises, including MCC and CNPC, as well as by companies from other countries. For example they protect a gas pipeline which goes from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India (Arduino, 2017).

Increasing the stabilization efforts by China could theoretically lead to improvement of investment security in Afghanistan. However, it should be kept in mind that for China, investing in Afghanistan is of secondary importance in comparison with its economic interests in Central Asia region (Cordesman, Hess, 2014). For the PRC, Afghanistan's security is important mainly so that negative phenomena such as terrorism and separatism could not spread for neighboring territories. This would mean both lowering the level of security of Chinese investments in Central Asia, and could also deepen the instability in the Chinese Xinjiang province (Kam, 2017). From this province, China has access to Central Asia, Afghanistan and also friendly Pakistan. China wants to stabilize and accelerate economic development of Xinjiang province. For this reason, in the western part of the province it has created the Kashgar Special Economic Zone, which may play an important role in the economic cooperation with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Therefore, stabilization of Afghanistan is important for China for both internal and external reasons (Peyrouse, 2016).

The PRC supports the peace process in Afghanistan with soft, mainly economic methods, supplemented by diplomatic activities. Investments in the mining industry of Afghanistan are to be a development stimulus for the country, which may also contribute to the stabilization of the state. Relative calming of the security situation in Afghanistan would enable implementation of PRC's mining projects in this country. In this situation, Afghanistan could eventually become an increasingly important economic partner of China (Hoyt, 2016). If the security situation in Afghanistan improved significantly, China would make much more investment in the Afghan mining industry (Dobbins, 2014). Currently, however, there are no prospects for improving the security situation in Afghanistan. This may, therefore, force Chinese companies to suspend and delay investments. It may also convince China to send its own soldiers to protect investments and strengthen security of Afghanistan. The Chinese authorities are already considering building a military base in the Wakhan Corridor linking the Afghan Badakhshan province with the Chinese Xinjiang province (Pandey, 2018).

REFERENCES

Afghanistan Energy Profile. (2012). [Access: 12.03.2018]. Access on the internet: http://globserver.cn/en/afghanistan/energy.

Afghanistan Ministry of Mines. *Afghanistan Oil and Gas Resources* [Access: 12.03.2018]. Access on the internet: http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Oil_&_Gas_Brochure_2.pdf.

International Business Publications. (2012). *Afghanistan. Mineral, mining sector investment and business guide.* Vol. 1. *Strategic, practical information and opportunities.* Washington D.C.: Global Investment & Business Center.

Ali, M. (2015). *Peripheral South Asian response to the growth of Chinese power: a study in dichotomous continuity* [in:] Li, M., Kemburi, K.M., ed., *China's Power and Asian Security.* London–New York: Routledge, p. 111-138.

Arduino, A. (2017). *China's Energy Interests in Central Asia and Russia: Symbiotic distrust and striking a balance between cooperation and confrontation* [in:] Wu, F., Zhang, H., ed., *China's Global Quest for Resources: Energy, Food and Water.* London–New York: Routledge, p. 119-137.

British Petroleum. (2012). *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011* [Access: 12.03.2018]. Access on the internet: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/de_de/PDFs/brochures/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2011.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook. Afghanistan. Energy* [Access: 12.03.2018]. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

Cordesman, A., Hess A. (2014). *Transition in the Afghanistan-Pakistan War and the uncertain role of the great powers* [in:] Krause, J., Mallory, C.K., ed., *Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. Adjusting Western regional policy.* London–New York: Routledge, p. 237-268.

Crane, K., Greenfield, V. (2014). *The NATO drawdown: implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan* [in:] Krause, J., Mallory, C.K., ed., *Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. Adjusting Western regional policy.* London–New York: Routledge, p. 269-289.

Dobbins, J. (2014). *Launching an Afghan peace process* [in:] Krause, J., Mallory, C.K., ed., *Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. Adjusting Western regional policy.* London-New York: Routledge, pp. 149-170.

Downs, E. (2012). *China Buys into Afghanistan.* "SAIS Review" Vol. XXXII, No. 2.

Gacek, Ł. (2013). *Azja Centralna w polityce energetycznej Chin.* Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Gajda, J. (2015). *Zaangażowanie Chin w Afganistanie – stan obecny i perspektywy.* „Biuletyn Opinie FAE" No. 4.

Gartenstein-Ross, D., Trombly, D., Barr, N. (2014). *Chinas Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan,* Washington D.C.: Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Hausheng, Z. (2012). *China and Afghanistan. China's Interests, Stances, and Perspectives, A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program,* Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Hoyt, T.D. (2016). *US-China cooperation: the role of Pakistan after the death of Osama bin Laden* [in:] Ping, J.H., McCormick, B., ed., *China's Strategic Priorities.* London-New York: Routledge, p. 114-128.

Hynek, N., Eichler, J. (2012). *Post-decisional and alliance-dependent: the Czech engagement in Logar* [in:] Hynek, N., Marton, P., ed., *Statebuilding in Afghanistan. Multinational contributions to reconstruction.* London: New York: Routledge, p. 226-242.

International Copper Study Group. (2016). *The World Copper Factbook 2016* [Access: 12.03.2018]. Access on the internet: http://www.icsg.org/index.php/component/jdownloads/finish/170/2202.

Kam, S. (2017). *China and the threat of terrorism* [in:] Boon H.T., ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi,* London–New York: Routledge, p. 189-204.

Lanteigne, M. (2016). *Chinese Foreign Policy. An Introduction, Third Edition.* London-New York: Routledge.

Opacin, N. (2015). *China's Role in Afghanistan. A Capitalist Peace Approach,* Hamburg: Anchor Academic Publishing.

Pandey, S. (2018). *China's Surreptitious Advance in Afghanistan.* "The Diplomat" 22 September [Access: 18.03.2018]. Access on the internet: https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/chinas-surreptitious-advance-in-afghanistan/.

Pantucci, R., Petersen, A. (2012). *China Digs in to Afghanistan.* "The National Interest" 24 May [Access: 18.03.2018]. Access on the internet: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-digs-afghanistan-6961?page=2.

Peyrouse, S. (2016). *Perspectives and limits on Sino-US competition: the Kazakhstan case study* [in:] Zweig, D., Hao, Y., ed., *Sino-US Energy Triangles. Resource diplomacy under hegemony.* London-New York: Routledge, p. 169-184.

Qassem, A.S. (2009). *Afghanistan's Political Stability. A Dream Unrealised.* London–New York: Routledge.

Tripathi, D. (2016). *The US role in Afghanistan: a critical overview* [in:] Harsehé, R., Tripathi D., ed., *Afghanistan Post-2014. Power configurations and evolving trajectories.* New Delhi–London–New York: Routledge, p. 73-91.

United Nations Environment Program. *Natural Resource Management and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan* [Access: 18.03.2018]. Access on the internet: http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Afghanistan_NRM_guidance_chart.pdf.

Zaborowski, W. (2012). *Polityka Chin wobec Afganistanu w kontekście zakończenia misji ISAF.* "Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe" No. III-IV.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2019.mmr.2

The text was submitted to the editorial office: January 2019.
The text was accepted for publication: March 2019.